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Non-governmental development organizations are expected to focus on countries with poor governance. New evidence shows
that they do not. While they do tend to focus more than bilateral donors on poor countries, they make some curious
geographical choices. It seems that they too have their ‘donor darlings’.
The Central African Republic is an extremely poor, landlocked country where around
three million people live below the poverty line. Malawi also has no access to the sea, and
has four million poor. One would expect these two countries to receive roughly the same
volume of aid from organizations such as Care, Hivos and Plan. In reality, however, 50 of
the world’s largest non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs, as distinct
from humanitarian agencies) spend only about €1 million a year in the Central African
Republic, compared with more than €70 million a year in Malawi.
In policy documents issued by the World Bank, the United Nations and bilateral donors
such as the Netherlands and the UK, it is often stated that NGDOs are better suited to
working in countries without good governance than are other development actors.
Commentators such as Alan Fowler and William Easterly support this view. But are they
indeed more active in these countries? Agencies like Action Aid have criticized bilateral
donors for not focusing sufficiently on poor countries, implying that NGDOs have a better
track record in this respect, but is that true?
Until recently, it was not possible to answer such questions because no one monitored where these organizations spent their
money. However, A new database, compiled by the author, contains information provided by 50 of the world’s largest NGDOs,
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including Oxfam Novib, Save the Children and World Vision (see box ). It is now possible toNGDO country allocation database
see whether expectations regarding these organizations’ choices of countries to receive aid are reflected in reality. This article
looks at the new database and tests the validity of these expectations.
Focus on bad governance
Many academics and policy makers assume that the governance environment is one of the main factors for NGDOs to decide
where they go. In its influential report  (1998), the World Bank stated thatAssessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why
‘In highly distorted environments the government is failing to provide supportive policies and effective services. That is why
government-to-government financial transfers produce poor results. Effective aid in such an environment often involves
supporting civil society to pressure the government to change or to take service provision directly into its own hands (or to do
both)’.
The United Nations shares this opinion. In its report  (2005), itInvesting in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the MDGs
states that there are ‘countries that rank consistently low on civil liberties, political freedoms and human rights, while rating high
on corruption, with little demonstrable will to achieve broad-based poverty reduction. In these cases, the international
community can play a role in humanitarian assistance and deliver aid through NGOs’. This view is echoed in the policy
documents of various bilateral donors. In  (2002), for example, the NetherlandsCivil Society and Structural Poverty Reduction
Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that ‘In cases of bad governance bilateral aid relationships are often underdeveloped;
cooperation from civil society to civil society is the only way’. The UK’s Department for International Development states in
similarly categorical terms: ‘… NGOs will need to play a more active role in providing public services in fragile states where
governments are weak and direct support to governments is not yet possible’.
Fowler suggests that bilateral donors focus more on countries with good governance because numerical targets can be more
easily achieved. NGDOs are then faced with the choice of whether to ‘follow the money’, or ‘to adopt strategic choices that, for
example, include a focus on … less poor or less favoured countries’. In a report on Dutch government funding of co-financing
agencies, Dietz . argue that NGOs should opt for the latter, because that is where their added value lies – in countries thatet al
are not eligible for bilateral aid because of governance deficiencies. ‘These “bad governance cases” often demand politically
more sensitive interventions, for which NGOs are thought to be better, and more appropriate agencies’.
In short, it is widely expected that private aid agencies will be involved in countries where good governance is lacking. But do
they actually focus on such countries? The answer is a clear and simple ‘no’. With the best will in the world, it is impossible to
find a link between the quality of governance in a country and the level of aid it receives from NGDOs. There is no distinction
between the choices of countries by bilateral donors and NGDOs, in terms of the quality of governance. Thus the choices made
by NGDOs contradict the expectations regarding their supposed added value in countries with bad governance. They focus on
the same countries as bilateral donors.
The figures show that NGDOs spend relatively more money in countries with moderately good governance than in those with
bad governance. They prefer Costa Rica to Cuba, Ghana to Togo, and Georgia to Azerbaijan. Why is this? Clearly, in a number
of countries, like Turkmenistan or North Korea, the governments are so repressive that foreign private aid agencies cannot
operate. But why do they not focus more on countries where they are expected to provide added value? There are, in general
terms, two possible explanations for this. First, academics and policy makers are wrong – NGDOs are not at all specially suited
to work in areas with bad governance – and the theory is therefore not valid. Perhaps civil society is particularly weak in such
countries and there are therefore no partners available for Northern organizations. If that is true, the NGDOs are making good
choices, but the policy theory is wrong. Second, the theory is correct and the situation in practice therefore needs to change.
The NGDOs offer clear added value in these countries, but there is something going wrong in the translation of theory into
practice, and that needs to be investigated. It is still too early to reach a conclusion on the first explanation. Some studies have
shown that NGDOs have achieved fantastic results in countries with bad governance, but others reveal that they have set up
unsustainable parallel systems in these countries. Because they take over tasks and staff from the government, this can
sometimes lead to a weakening of the state.
One thing is clear – there is no logical alternative to aid through NGDOs in countries without good governance. To establish
whether the policy theory is correct and practice must change, it is in any case necessary to look at another expectation
regarding NGDOs choices: that they focus on the poorest countries.
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Focus on poor countries
To what extent do geo-strategic interests influence the choice of countries to receive aid? The literature is rather critical of
governments’ motives for giving development aid. Studies of the geographical distribution of the aid provided by bilateral donors
show that, with a few exceptions, developing countries where they have political, economic and/or strategic interests receive
more aid than countries where such interests are less evident, but which may need the support more urgently. The large
volumes of aid provided by the United States to Egypt and Israel, for example, and the large-scale debt relief to Nigeria and Iraq
have more to do with politics than with poverty. Such behaviour is not expected of NGDOs: they can focus on the poorest
countries without having to take account of strategic interests.
The organizations themselves fuel these expectations. In a large advertisement in a Dutch national newspaper in 2006, for
example, Plan Nederland announced: ‘The cameras have left, the journalists have left, the diplomats have left, the aid agencies
have left, but we are still in Darfur’. In its 2005 annual report, Cordaid stated that ‘Cordaid does not only want to be active in
regions and countries where infrastructure is in good shape, where there is good governance and where our investments in
partners and programmes yield substantial returns. Cordaid wants explicitly to offer aid in areas where the population is on the
run and terrorized, and where minimal protection is only offered by churches and NGOs’. The assumption that NGDOs focus on
poor and marginal countries is so deeply rooted that researchers have only very recently started to investigate whether this is in
fact the case.
A recent study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on this issue addressed what NGOs did with funds provided by the
European Commission. It showed that they do take significant account of poverty levels, while the poverty focus of the
Commission’s regular aid generally leaves much to be desired. If we look at a broader sample of organizations we see that
there is a significant correlation between, for example, the life expectancy of people in developing countries and the quantity of
aid per capita. Countries where people on average die younger (a poverty indicator) receive less aid from NGDOs. This does
not apply to government-to-government (bilateral) aid. Recent research shows that there are large differences in the extent to
which private aid agencies focus on the poorest countries. Norwegian and American agencies focus significantly more on the
poorest countries than, for example, their German or Dutch counterparts. In general, however, NGDOs focus more on the
poorest countries than bilateral donors do.
If this were the end of the story, the conclusion would be that private aid agencies in general succeed in reaching poor countries
and that there is no cause for concern. Unfortunately, as can be seen from the map below, the reality is not that simple.
There are great inequalities in the levels of aid received by developing countries. The darker red a country on the map, the
more aid per capita it received from the world’s largest NGDOs in 2005. There is a definite tendency towards clustering.
Honduras, Nicaragua, the Palestinian Territories and Zambia, for example, received more than 20 times more aid per capita
from NGDOs than, for example, the Central African Republic, Guinea and Yemen.
So NGDOs too have their ‘donor darlings’. Recent research provides more insight into the causes of this clustering. The factors
that can lead private companies to cluster apply equally to NGDOs. They see no reason to start from scratch in a new country if
they have staff in others that have already been trained, or if there are local organizations that are used to working with
international agencies and can therefore fulfil their reporting obligations? If an NGDO has to choose, for example, between a
country where the banks hardly function, and one where their funds can be safely deployed, the choice is easily made. In other
words, why struggle in the Central African Republic if you can achieve more for the same money in Tanzania? This way of
thinking results in the ‘first-mover’ problem. Everyone would be better off if aid were more equally distributed among countries,
but many NGDOs are not prepared to make the first move.
There is therefore a wide gap between expectations of NGDOs and what they actually do in practice, especially with regard to
their focus on countries with bad governance, but also their focus on poor countries. Here we are concerned not so much with
the weaknesses in the theory as with trying to gain insight into this disconcerting discrepancy between theory and practice.
Ongoing research into the geographical choices of Dutch NGDOs between 1989 and 2005 reveals two aspects that have so far
received little attention: their relative rigidity or stability in terms of country selection, and the strategic nature of these choices.
Path dependency
Although NGDOs are expected to be flexible, recent studies show that there is a certain rigidity in the geographical distribution
of their activities. Anthony Bebbington of the University of Manchester, UK, in an analysis of the geographical choices of NGOs
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in Latin America, has observed what he refers to as ‘path dependency’. By this he means that the choices made by NGDOs in
the past leave a clear mark on their current choices. He has observed that, once an organization has chosen to work in a
certain region, its staff become involved in the local situation and encourage the agency to continue its activities, even if
circumstances change and the reasons for becoming involved in the first place no longer apply. In addition to these established
interests, Bebbington has also observed that formal and informal networks evolve, and then perpetuate themselves. In this way,
Northern organizations become acquainted with new partners in the regions in which they are already active, and ignore equally
good potential partners in other countries. NGDOs often say that they work with organizations they have come into contact ‘by
coincidence’. Bebbington calls this into doubt, and says that these ‘coincidental’ choices often arise from self-reinforcing social
networks.
To return to the example of Tanzania and the Central African Republic, if you are the manager of a Northern NGDO attending
an international conference, there is a greater chance that you will find yourself talking to the manager of an NGDO from
Tanzania than from the Central African Republic. An analysis of the choices made by Dutch NGDOs between 1989 and 2005
has shown that they remained very stable. Countries that received large amounts of NGDO aid in the late 1980s (e.g. Peru, the
Philippines and South Africa) were still among the major recipients more than 15 years later, despite the fact that the situation in
these countries had improved considerably. It is of course possible to think of reasons for this, such as the predictability of aid
and the desire to avoid capital destruction, but it also leads to a discrepancy between policy theory and the stability observed in
practice.
Donor-led behaviour
According to critics of NGDOs, all the explanations given above for the choices they make (poverty levels, clustering, path
dependency) are not the true determinants of these choices. They see NGDOs as organizations concerned with ensuring their
own survival and will therefore follow loyally in their own donors’ footsteps.
One way of determining whether this is true is to imagine what you would do if you were one of these organizations. You
receive 80% of your funding from one donor, who says that you are free to choose in which countries you wish to operate. If
you act strategically, you will make sure that your organization is as visible as possible to the donor. You will therefore choose
to operate in countries where the donor is active, and avoid those in which your donor is not interested. Between 1989 and
2005, Dutch NGDOs were in this situation: they received on average 80% of their income from the Dutch government and were
free in their choice of countries. However, a comparison of the countries they chose and those receiving aid from the Dutch
government shows that there is a clear link between the two. The more aid countries receive from the Dutch government, the
more they receive from Dutch NGDOs (Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO, Oxfam Novib and Plan in this sample). This relationship is shown
in the graph below by the ascending line.
Thus we can conclude that NGDOs imitate the choices of bilateral donors. The more an organization depends financially on its
official donor, the greater is the correlation between their choices of countries. The focus of Norwegian agencies on the poorest
countries reflects the choices of the Norwegian government, and the fragmented nature of German private aid that of German
bilateral assistance. Countries that receive a lot of funding from the Dutch government also receive a lot of money from Dutch
NGDOs. The influence is probably mutual: the choices of NGDOs also affect those made by bilateral agencies. If the Dutch
government tries to stop providing aid to a country where many Dutch organizations are active, the latter may start an intensive
lobbying campaign to persuade the government to continue its aid presence in the country concerned. But irrespective of who
influences whom, the result is the same: NGDOs are active in the same types of country as bilateral donors. Even though there
is probably some positive synergy between bilateral and NGDO aid in the same recipient countries, it is not in line with policy
theory, which suggests that they should focus on different countries.
Why are the geographical choices of NGDOs described as curious in the introduction? There are many expectations for
NGDOs’ country choices (which are reinforced by the agencies themselves), but these have been little researched, let alone
understood. Now that, for the first time, there is a database on the geographical choices of the major NGDOs, it is clear that
practice only partially concurs with theory. It is striking that the assumed added value of these organizations in countries where
good governance is lacking is not reflected in how they allocate their aid. They do focus more than bilateral donors on the
poorer countries, but their aid is unequally distributed. A small number of countries receive more than 20 times more NGDO aid
per capita than other comparable countries. Initiatives by NGDOs themselves to make high-risk investments with the aim of
redressing this inequality – such as the renewed involvement of Cordaid in the Central African Republic – should therefore be
welcomed wholeheartedly.
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